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I. Introduction 
EGULATIONS to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are 
being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions (RTCA 2013). Those 
requirements will apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS 
with the United States’ National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the 
overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS collectively operating in the 
NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment 
requirements to an airspace safety case.  Foremost among these is calculation of the system’s “risk ratio”—the degree 
to which a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard (Federal Aviation Administration 
2013). The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will 
determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not 
known what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most 
improve the pilot’s ability to maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall 
effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA 
operational and performance requirements can be finalized. 
Significant research effort has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace (Dalamagkidis 2012; 
Ostwald 2007; Gillian 2012; Hesselink 2011; Santiago and Mueller 2015; Rorie, Fern, and Shiveley 2015, 2016). 
Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation 
and flight testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a deployable system, so 
it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements for future traffic displays 
(Calhoun 2014). Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new displays, but they 
have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS equipped with DAA 
systems in the NAS (Bell 2012).  Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation 
standards.  Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case (Park 2014; 
Johnson 2015). 
The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well 
clear as a function of display features and surveillance sensor error. This quantification will help enable selection of a 
minimum set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second 
objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA system 
performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch experiments 
will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human simulations. This capability 
is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all foreseeable operational 
conditions.  Moreover, results related to the performance of the pilots’ use of displays and the time they needed to carry 
out different aspects of this task may be found in two companion papers (Rorie, Fern, and Shiveley 2015, 2016).  This 
paper reports on a simulation that follows on work presented in Santiago’s study (2015) and builds directly on that 
study’s results.  
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II. Methodology 
A. Participants 
The pilot subjects in this study were all active duty U.S. military pilots.  They averaged 1100 hours of UAS flight 
time, with approximately 30 of those hours in domestic controlled airspace.  Pilots did not have previous experience 
using a traffic display to conduct DAA operations in an air traffic control (ATC) environment.  Two active duty air 
traffic controllers participated in the study as confederates, relaying standard clearances to the pilots and approving 
their requests for DAA maneuvers.  For additional details regarding pilot training procedures, instructions for the 
DAA task, and metrics related to pilot response time, see Rorie, Fern, and Shiveley 2016. 
B. Simulation Environment 
The airspace simulator used to coordinate the subsystems used in this experiment was based on the Multi Aircraft 
Control System (MACS) (Prevot 2002). That system simulated all aircraft other than the UAS under study, provided 
a pilot interface for “pseudo-pilot” confederates to control the non-UAS aircraft, and provided an ATC interface that 
controller confederates used to respond to UAS pilot commands and direct overall airspace operations.  An additional 
ATC confederate would take control of intruder aircraft in MACS according to an experiment script in order to create 
predicted losses of well clear (LoWC) with the subject UAS. 
The UAS subject pilots controlled their aircraft using the vigilant spirit control station (VSCS), which was 
developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) (Feitshans et al. 2008).  In addition to standard UAS 
interfaces, the pilots were provided with a tactical situation display (TSD) that was their primary interface to mission-
specific information (e.g., the flight plan) and which contained all elements of the DAA human interface.  For 
additional information on the pilot interface and airspace design see Rorie, Fern, and Shiveley 2016. 
C. Experiment Design 
The pilots in the experiment flew four separate missions, each time with a different combination of DAA display 
and algorithm elements.  These DAA system designs built upon the findings of previous studies (Santiago 2015; Rorie, 
Fern, and Shiveley 2015) and incorporated enhancements suggested by past participants.  An “information only” 
display provided only basic information about each intruder, including relative altitude, bearing and range, along with 
alerts about intruders predicted to lose well clear.  The alerting scheme used in this study, which also builds on those 
previous studies, is shown in Table 1. A detailed description of the well clear definition and its parameters is given in 
Cook and Brooks (2015), and the values used in this study are given in Table 3. In the information-only display 
configuration no maneuver guidance was provided to the pilots. 
 
Table 1. DAA alert definitions 
ALERT LEVEL SEPARATION 
CRITERIA 
TIME UNTIL LOSS 
OF WELL CLEAR 
ICON AURAL ALERT 
VERBIAGE 
DAA WARNING 
ALERT 
DMOD = 0.75 nmi 
HMD = 0.75 nmi 
ZTHR = 450 ft 
25 sec 
 
 
“Traffic, Maneuver 
Now” 
CORRECTIVE DAA 
ALERT 
DMOD = 0.75 nmi 
HMD  = 0.75 nmi 
ZTHR = 450 ft 
75 sec 
 
 
“Traffic, Separate” 
PREVENTIVE DAA 
ALERT 
DMOD = 0.75 nmi 
HMD = 1.0 nmi 
ZTHR = 700 ft 
75 sec 
 
 
“Traffic, Monitor” 
DAA PROXIMATE 
ALERT 
DMOD = 0.75 nmi 
HMD = 1.5 nmi 
ZTHR = 1200 ft 
85 sec 
 
 
 
N/A 
NONE (TARGET) Within surveillance 
field of regard 
N/A 
 
N/A 
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The second display configuration incorporated all the informational aids contained in the information-only 
configuration, and it also included a “vector planner” feature.  That feature, which was represented as an arrow that 
the pilot could rotate around his aircraft symbol at the center of the TSD, would change color depending on the level 
of alert expected if the aircraft turned to the heading indicated by the arrow.  A similar feature was available for 
altitude alert planning purposes: a set of altitude blocks near the UAS’s current altitude were color-coded according 
to the level of alert expected if the aircraft climbed or descended to and maintained the given altitude.  The color-
coding of these headings and altitudes was consistent with the highest alert level specified in Table 1 that was predicted 
over the subsequent 85 seconds. 
The last two display configurations, called Stratway+ and the Omni Bands, showed bands of color around the UAS 
symbol at the center of the TSD at all times when a preventive threat level or higher was predicted.  This represented 
the same information contained in the vector planner configuration; however, the pilot did not need to activate and 
slew the arrow symbol to see what threats lay in each direction; that information was always available as a band.  In 
the Stratway+ implementation (Chamberlain 2015), a yellow band showed the pilots any heading or altitude that 
contained a preventive alert or higher; no differentiation between the levels was indicated.  Pilots were also provided 
green bands that indicated the best heading or altitude to fly to in the event that a LoWC was unavoidable, but which 
would result in the fastest return to well clear status.  The Omni Bands implementation was very similar to the 
Stratway+, except the level of alert for a given heading or altitude was indicated by changing the appearance of the 
bands: a preventive alert was represented by dashed yellow bands, a corrective alert by solid yellow bands, and a 
warning alert by solid red bands.  Further information about the JADEM algorithm underlying the alerts in all the 
displays and the guidance information in the vector planner and Omni Bands displays may be found in Abramson et 
al. (2016). 
D. Surveillance System Uncertainty 
The surveillance system model created for this simulation was designed to provide the pilot with a realistic level 
of uncertainty expected in a minimum operational performance standards (MOPS)-compliant DAA system.  It was 
not designed to be high fidelity, however, and did not capture complex dependencies between intruder geometry, 
sensor types, and sensor fusion algorithms.  The objective in testing surveillance uncertainty was simply to determine 
whether major differences in pilot acceptability and rate of well clear violations would occur with a modest level of 
uncertainty. 
The DAA surveillance sensor model combined sampling of a Gaussian distribution, characterized by a bias error 
and standard deviation, in which each sample was uncorrelated with those before or after it, with a moving average 
filter that averaged together the last N measurements (see the diagram in Figure 1). This second step allowed sensor 
measurements that were passed to the DAA system to be correlated in time, but they preserved the original variance 
of the Gaussian distribution.  Half of the pilots flew all of their missions (and all of the display configurations) with 
this sensor model, while the other half of the pilots flew all missions with no sensor error (the “perfect” condition).  
This between-subjects comparison was designed to minimize the biasing effect that would occur if a subject saw both 
the perfect and imperfect conditions.  
 
Figure 1. DAA surveillance sensor error model. 
The sensor model was calibrated against flight-test data gathered at NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center in 
2014.  The goal of the calibration was not to precisely match the error characteristics of the prototype system under 
test there—an effort that would have been impossible given the simple design of the model.  Instead, the goal was to 
provide pilots with a level of DAA surveillance error that was representative of errors they might experience with a 
future, certified DAA system.  This level of error, which could be higher or lower than the error in a certified system, 
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is quantified according to metrics contained in Figure 2 and Table 2 so that designers of future systems can estimate 
the level of impact their system’s surveillance error will have on a pilot’s ability to perform DAA functions.  If such 
a future system has lower error than that tested here, then it is likely the impact on the DAA function will also be 
lower than what was measured in this simulation. 
Two primary metrics were used to compare the flight-test and simulation errors: (1) the actual absolute error in 
either the lateral or vertical estimate of an intruder’s position, and (2) the difference in error between consecutive 
sensor measurements.  For this simulation, it was determined that the difference in consecutive measurements was the 
more important metric to match because it is the error that is experienced by the pilot.  Such errors cause alerts to 
appear and disappear as predictions move inside and outside the well clear boundary, and the inconsistent movement 
of targets on the display makes it difficult to extrapolate the future position of the intruder.  On the other hand, the 
absolute error between the displayed position of the intruder and the actual position of the (simulated) target is never 
apparent to the pilot.  While such errors are critical in the actual performance of a DAA system, they do not directly 
degrade the performance of the pilot.  The effect of such errors is better measured with a large number of realistic 
encounters between UAS and historical manned aircraft in batch simulations, not in pilot-in-the-loop simulations.  For 
these reasons the surveillance model was calibrated against the measurement-to-measurement errors rather than the 
absolute errors.  The results of the calibration are indicated in Figure 2 and Table 2. 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of surveillance system model errors (blue) to flight test error measurements (red) for  
lateral errors (left) and altitude errors (right). 
Table 2. Comparison of DAA surveillance sensor accuracy between flight test and simulation 
 Flight Test Simulation 
Mean Diff Horizontal Error (ft)
 
54.48
 
30.61
 
Median Diff Horizontal Error (ft)
 
20.08
 
19.03
 
Mean Diff Altitude Error (ft) 36.47
 
18.28 
Median Diff Altitude Error (ft)
 
17.80
 
10.06
 
 
E. Loss of Well Clear Metrics 
The separation standard that UAS must adhere to when they encounter VFR aircraft is referred to as “well clear,” 
and a failure to maintain the separation standard is called a “loss of well clear” (LoWC).  The effects of different 
definitions of well clear have been evaluated in detail (Johnson, Mueller, and Santiago 2015), and the final definition 
accepted by the community developing standards for DAA systems (RTCA 2013) is described in a paper by Cook and 
Brooks (2015).  The parameters that specify the separation standard are given in Table 3. A loss of well clear occurs 
when the following conditions are met at the current time: 
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Table 3. Well clear parameter values 
Parameter Value 
Modified tau (∗ ) 35 sec. 
DMOD 4000 ft. 
HMD* 4000 ft. 
Vertical threshold, dh* 450 ft 
 
 
The fact that a LoWC occurred does not indicate the reason for the LoWC or how to reduce the rate at which it 
occurs.  Although all LoWCs are serious events, knowing that a LoWC occurred because an intruder changed altitude 
shortly before the LoWC will suggest a different remedy than an LoWC that occurred because the pilot returned to 
course before the conflict had been resolved. For these reasons, seven different categories of LoWCs were created and 
each encounter that resulted in a LoWC was assigned to a single category.  The analyses given in the results section 
use this categorization as appropriate in order to fairly judge the overall pilot-DAA system performance in the real 
world by correcting for unavoidable simulation artifacts.  LoWCs were assigned to one of seven categories that were 
further classified according to whether or not they were the pilot’s responsibiity: 
 
• Ineffective maneuver.  LoWCs in this category stemmed from the pilot’s selection of a maneuver that 
did not increase the inter-aircraft separation to more than the well clear standard despite being alerted to 
the conflict with sufficient time to respond (>10 sec).  Losses in this category are typically caused by a 
lack of guidance information to the pilot (i.e., no assistance from a conflict resolution algorithm) or lack 
of pilot experience in the type or size of maneuver required to avoid the LoWC.  This category is assigned 
to “pilot’s responsibility.”  
 
• Slow pilot response. The losses in this category were due to slow creation and execution of encounter 
resolution maneuvers, and they are distinguished from LoWCs in the “ineffective maneuver” category 
by the fact that they would have created adequate separation if they had been executed earlier. Slow 
responses could result from pilots spending an excessive amount of time watching the progression of a 
conflict, or from repeated attempts to contact ATC over a busy frequency before attempting a maneuver. 
This category is assigned to “pilot’s responsibility.” 
 
• Early return to flight plan. On several occasions pilots were able to successfully avoid LoWCs during 
the beginning of an encounter, but they turned back towards their original flight plan before that return 
path was free of conflicts with the intruder.  This type of LoWC occurs only when specific guidance 
tools are unavailable and so it is important to distinguish this from other LoWCs. This category is distinct 
from the previous categories because the intruder was no longer an active threat, but the pilot, in an 
attempt to rejoin their route, directly caused a LoWC. This type of LoWC occurs when there is a lack of 
guidance information available regarding when a return is conflict-free. This category is assigned to 
“pilot’s responsibility.” 
 
• Intruder late maneuver/acceleration. A complex choreography of intruder maneuvers was required to 
deliver the right sequence of encounters to each pilot and compensate for the unique resolution 
maneuvers performed by each pilot leading up to a given encounter.  Occasionally, this complex series 
of maneuvers resulted in a first alert of a predicted LoWC with 10 seconds or less of warning time.  
Although such late maneuvers and resulting LoWCs will occur in the real world, the rate at which that 
will happen should be measured in separate simulations with realistic intruder trajectories, the 
consequences of which can be modeled with automated collision avoidance algorithms.  The results of 
such encounters do not provide meaningful data on the performance of the pilot-DAA system because 
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the outcomes of the encounters are determined by the available warning time, not the system under test.  
This category is not assigned to “pilot’s responsibility.” 
 
• DAA surveillance system elevation error. The elevation error modeled for the DAA surveillance 
system resulted in measurement-to-measurement altitude differences of up to hundreds of feet.  Because 
the vertical separation requirement is only 450 ft and aircraft are routinely separated operationally by 
500 ft, these surveillance errors can artificially indicate that a LoWC has occurred.  In fact, almost all 
encounters that were in reality separated by 500 ft would have appeared at one point or another to have 
separation less than 450 ft because of the surveillance system error.  The relatively small number of such 
LoWCs is due to the fact that pilots would proactively change altitude when they observed this 
intermittent alerting behavior in order to avoid such a loss.  This category is not assigned to “pilot’s 
responsibility.” 
 
• Diverging loss. An unanticipated and un-alerted type of LoWC occurred when an aircraft “clipped” the 
rear boundary of the well clear separation cylinder (4000 ft radius, ±450 ft vertical distance) and the 
relative range rate between the aircraft was positive (diverging aircraft).  When the range rate is positive 
the HMD was automatically set to infinity (rather than the current inter-aircraft range, which is the 
correct approach), so a LoWC was not predicted to occur and the pilot received no alert about that portion 
of the trajectory.  Other elements of the DAA display did indicate that very close separation was 
predicted, so, although this assignment is certainly debatable, this category is assigned to “pilot’s 
responsibility.” 
 
• Bug. On one occasion an error in the display of state and alert information to the pilot caused an LoWC.  
This error (“bug”) was immediately fixed and this category of LoWC is not assigned to “pilot’s 
responsibility.” 
 
F. Well Clear Penetration Integral 
The severity of LoWCs has been measured using several different metrics in a previous study (Santiago 2015).  
Typical methods include the time spent in a LoWC state and the geometric proximity of the two aircraft at their closest 
point of approach (CPA) normalized by the well clear separation cylinder (i.e., 4000 ft horizontally and 450 ft 
vertically).  However, the UAS DAA community has not agreed to a single metric that relates LoWC severity to the 
elevated level of collision risk that accompanies the LoWC.  The well clear penetration integral (WCPI) is a proposed 
method for incorporating both the geometric proximity of the aircraft and the time spent in violation in a single 
measure.  The mathematical definition of the WCPI is given in Eq. (2), while an illustration of the difference in severity 
of two encounters with significantly different WCPI values is shown in Figure 3.  
 
    	  !"#$$$%&'()#$$$ , "#*$%(&)#*$ + ,*%-./0,* 1          (2) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Differences in LoWC severity (credit: Bihrle Applied Research, unpublished). 
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The WCPI uses normalized separation terms inside the integrand in order to account for the differences between 
horizontal and vertical separations and the temporal term, modified tau. Equation 2 can be approximated with a 
summation (j = 1 to n) for all time steps of the LoWC, with horizontal miss distance, vertical miss distance, and 
modified tau values specified in Table 3. The purpose of the modified tau term is to reduce the contribution of the 
early stages of the LoWC, during which separation can still be quite large.  
III. Results 
The following sections present results related to the ability of pilots to avoid losses of well clear, the relationship 
between LoWCs and TCAS alerts for different encounters, and the behavior of pilots in reacting to and implementing 
avoidance maneuvers. 
A. Loss of Well Clear Rate 
The proportion of LoWCs out of all encounters that were predicted to become LoWCs without pilot intervention 
is shown in Figure 4.  Only those losses of well clear that were deemed to have been pilot responsibility are shown.  
For example, if an intruder maneuvered without warning and caused an immediate LoWC, then that encounter would 
not be considered a LoWC and would be removed from the analysis for this chart entirely (though the data is retained 
and displayed as part of other analyses).  The information-only display condition resulted in a LoWC rate two to four 
times higher than any other display, a result confirming the findings of previous studies (Santiago 2015).  A pilot 
requires not just an alert that an encounter could result in a LoWC, they also need some level of guidance about how 
to respond to the alert.  The two banding guidance displays achieved similar performance at around 5% LoWC, while 
the vector planner condition had approximately twice this rate of LoWCs.  The banding displays provide a clear 
improvement in DAA performance by reducing the rate of LoWCs over the two alternative designs. 
 
 
Figure 4.Proportion of losses of well clear by display. Only LoWCs that were the "pilot's responsibility" are included. 
The results in Figure 4 appear to clearly indicate that the banding displays deliver better LoWC performance than 
the other two display conditions tested, but that conclusion requires a significance test.  Because the number of LoWCs 
per scenario in each display condition are not normally distributed, the common analysis of variance (ANOVA) test 
is not appropriate.  Instead, we apply the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test of significance (Kruskal and Wallace 
1952; Daniel 1990). The significance matrix for the difference in number of LoWCs between each display 
configuration is given in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Significance value for rate of LoWC by display condition 
Display Condition Info Only Stratway+ OmniBands Vector Planner 
Info Only 1.0 0.0159 0.0011 0.0866 
Stratway+  1.0 0.2067 0.5569 
OmniBands   1.0 0.0902 
Vector Planner    1.0 
 
The values in the table are color-coded according to the level of significance, with green being significant at the 
0.05 level, beige being marginally significant between 0.05 and 1.0, and the rest not significant.  Compared to the 
information-only display, both Stratway+ and Omnibands are significantly different in terms of the number of LoWCs 
per scenario (0.0159 and 0.0011, respectively).  The vector planner shows a marginally statistically significant 
reduction in the rate of LoWCs (0.0866) compared with information only.  The Omnibands also have a marginally 
statistically significant reduction in number of LoWCs compared with the vector planner (0.0902).  There is no 
measureable difference between the two bands displays (0.2067). These results confirm the observations from Figure 
4 that the banding displays provide an important improvement in pilot performance of the DAA function. 
 
B. Losses of Well Clear by Alert Time and Range 
Previous studies have shown that the rate at which LoWCs occur is related to the time between first alert and the 
predicted LoWC, which is in turn related to the inter-aircraft range at this first alert (Santiago 2015).  This section 
presents LoWC results as a function of these temporal and geometric parameters.  For the analysis in this section, 
LoWCs that a pilot could reasonably have avoided with the information and interfaces at their disposal were retained, 
while those that were completely beyond a pilot’s control were filtered out. See Section II.E for a description of these 
categories.  The effects of factors beyond a pilot’s control will be determined through separate large-scale, fast-time 
simulations involving tens of thousands of aircraft.  This section reports on the effectiveness of the combined pilot-
DAA system in remaining well clear as a function of the time and distance at which a “valid” alert is received, defined 
as the time at which three (not necessarily consecutive) corrective or warning alerts are provided for the same intruder. 
The outcomes of all encounters across the four display conditions as a function of the first valid alert is shown in 
Figure 5.  The green sections of each bar indicate encounters that were predicted (and scripted as part of the scenario) 
to result in a LoWC, but were successfully resolved by the pilot using the DAA system.  As observed in prior 
simulations (Santiago and Mueller 2015), the rate of LoWCs is relatively constant when more than 20 sec of warning 
is provided to the pilot, but the rate increases to 44% when less than 20 sec is available and is 60% when the time is 
under 10 sec. What is novel in this chart is the assignment of a reason for the LoWC, and these causes vary significantly 
between the short and long alert time LoWCs.  Most of the LoWCs at low alert times are due to late intruder 
maneuvers, which is precisely the reason the alert time was short, and so this is an expected result.  Although intruder 
maneuvers continue to cause some LoWCs at larger alert times, the reasons for the LoWCs shift towards factors that 
are the pilot’s responsibility: ineffective maneuvers, slow responses, and early returns to the flight plan.  While the 
first two of those factors can be reduced by increasing the alert time available to the pilot, the early return to flight 
plan is in no way affected by the original alert time.   Instead, as will be clear from the charts that partition these results 
by individual display conditions, better DAA guidance can eliminate this cause of LoWC entirely. 
The LoWC rate when alert times are under 10 seconds is 60%, which may appear low given that the pilot would 
have almost no time to formulate and uplink a maneuver before it was too late for the aircraft’s dynamics to physically 
avoid a LoWC.  However, pilots did notice such intruders approaching and would be ready to execute a resolution 
maneuver immediately at the first alert. The banding displays were particularly effective in this regard; pilots could 
observe the red warning alert bands grow towards their current heading and altitude and therefore were primed to act 
when the alert was issued. 
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Figure 5. Outcomes of encounters by time to first loss of well clear at which an alert was provided.  All displays. 
The outcomes of encounters in the information-only display condition are shown in Figure 6; just under 20% of the 
total number of encounters became LoWCs that were the pilot’s responsibility. In addition to a higher overall rate of 
LoWC, the rate at which LoWCs were avoided when less than 10 sec of warning time was available increased to 73% 
compared with 45% for the other three displays (60% overall).  This indicates that with the information-only display 
pilots are less able to anticipate potential LoWCs when alerts are not timely, either because of surveillance sensor 
uncertainty or because of late-maneuvering intruders.  The rate of LoWCs when the full alert time was provided to 
the pilot (between 70 and 80 sec to LoWC) in this condition is very high at 25% (9 of 36) compared with the rate of 
the other three displays combined (8.3%, 8 of 96).  These high LoWC rates at both ends of the alert time spectrum, 
along with the observation that the causes of most LoWCs at the long alert times are prevented with DAA guidance, 
indicates that the information-only display is likely insufficient to meet the safety requirements for DAA systems. 
 
Figure 6.  Outcomes of encounters by time to first loss of well clear at which an alert was provided.  Information-only display. 
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The encounter outcomes for the vector planner display are shown in Figure 7.  The overall pilot-responsible LoWC 
rate was intermediate between the information-only display and the two banding displays at about 10%.  Ineffective 
maneuver LoWCs dropped significantly due to the additional information provided to the pilot about alerts that would 
occur if specific headings or altitudes were selected.  Interestingly, this display configuration had the most LoWCs 
attributed to slow execution of the maneuver (i.e., two), but the mean pilot response time for an alert was faster than 
for the information-only display (Rorie, Fern, and Shively 2016). For some encounters, pilots may have spent too 
much time using the vector planner tool to search for a successful resolution maneuver, though on average it did not 
slow them down by more than three to five seconds compared with the banding displays.  Although the vector planner 
display did improve on the information-only display in terms of the LoWC rate at both ends of the alert time range 
and provided shorter pilot response times, it made the altitude and heading alerting information directly available on 
the banding displays more difficult to access. For these reasons the vector planner display should not be implemented 
for a DAA system. 
 
Figure 7. Outcomes of encounters by time to first loss of LoWC at which an alert was provided.  Vector planner display. 
 The banding displays showed the lowest LoWC rates among the four display conditions, and the specific encounter 
outcomes for each are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. Pilots were unable to avoid a LoWC during several encounters 
using the no-fly bands, though the three slow and ineffective maneuver LoWCs all occurred with less than half of the 
normal alerting time.  On two occasions the pilots returned to their original flight plan too early and caused a LoWC, 
possibly because of a mismatch between the aircraft dynamics used to calculate the band guidance and the dynamics 
used in the simulation itself.  However, the overall pilot-responsibility LoWC rate of 6% is excellent compared with 
the non-banding displays, and is statistically identical to the 4% LoWC rate provided by the Omni Bands display.  As 
shown in Figure 9, the only pilot-responsibility LoWCs that occurred in this display condition were under diverging 
circumstances—the aircraft were in fact getting farther apart when the LoWC was recorded.  These LoWCs can likely 
be avoided simply by changing the alerting logic so that it permits alerts even when aircraft are predicted to be 
separating.  Within the limits of simulation fidelity and encounter realism, the Omni Bands display performed nearly 
flawlessly.  The authors recommend using a band-type display that indicates at least the heading and altitude 
commands that would lead to corrective or warning alerts.  The alerts should be calculated by simulating the trajectory 
of the aircraft until it reaches the new heading or altitude rather than instantaneously setting the aircraft’s state to the 
commanded state and building the trajectory from there.  The additional trajectory fidelity this provides reduces the 
rate of LoWCs and provides better information to the pilot.  A DAA system based on this type of display and algorithm 
is likely to meet the safety requirements necessary to operate UAS in the NAS. 
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Figure 8. Outcomes of encounters by time to first loss of LoWC at which an alert was provided.  Stratway+ display. 
 
Figure 9. Outcomes of encounters by time to first loss of LoWC at which an alert was provided.  Omni Bands display. 
The time until well clear is first lost is a useful metric from a pilot’s perspective because it indicates roughly how 
quickly they must respond to an alert; however, other aspects of the DAA system and NAS operate on distance rather 
than time.  For example, the detection range of a DAA surveillance sensor is largely a function of range and does not 
depend strongly on the direction or velocity of the intruder.  Similarly, air traffic controllers use the current range 
between aircraft in deciding whether or not to issue traffic advisories to pilots regarding proximate traffic (Mueller 
2015). The relationship between the time to CPA at first alert and the range at first alert depends on the velocity of 
each aircraft and their relative encounter geometry. The outcomes of encounters as a function of the range at first valid 
alert across all four display conditions are shown in Figure 10.  An interesting difference between the range and time-
to-CPA charts is that in the range chart the LoWCs are concentrated at ranges of 4 nmi and below, with few LoWCs 
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at larger ranges and many non-LoWCs at these larger ranges.  In contrast, the time-to-CPA charts have a large number 
of LoWCs at the long and short ends of the alerting time range.  This difference suggests that many of those long-
alert-time LoWCs occurred at short range, implying slow closure rates. These acute angle encounters can be the most 
difficult to resolve and can also transition from a non-threat to a threat status very quickly.  Although pilots should 
continue to be alerted according to time-to-CPA criteria, they should also pay particular attention to those intruders 
that are closer than 4 nmi away and request separation from such vehicles if they have not already received a traffic 
advisory. 
 
Figure 10.  Outcome of encounter by range at which first alert was received. 
C. Severity of Losses of Well Clear 
The severity of violations for those encounters that resulted in losses of well clear was evaluated in three ways: 
geometric proximity of the closest point of approach, duration of the violation, and a combined integral that 
incorporated both geometric and temporal aspects of the violation into the single “well clear penetration integral” 
(WCPI) defined by Eq. 2. 
The severity index is a measure of the geometric proximity of two aircraft that compensates for the different 
distance thresholds used in the vertical and horizontal domains.  It does not use any temporal measures to evaluate 
severity.  It is defined as 
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where the h_sepCA and v_sepCA are the geometric portions of the well clear definition, with values of 4000 ft and 450 
ft, respectively.  The maximum normalized separation is computed at each time step, and the minimum value over the 
entire trajectory becomes the separation index.  For predictions rather than the actual encounter trajectory, the index 
is computed in the same way but is done over the prediction made at each time step.  The lowest predicted separation 
index over all these predictions is what is reported in Figure 11.  Over all the displays, only 30% of encounters actually 
penetrated the 4000 ft horizontal and 450 ft vertical separation cylinder; the rest violated it with a modified tau under 
35 sec but maneuvered away before reaching the separation cylinder.  The DAA systems overall raised the median 
predicted separation index from 0.59 to 1.06, and none of the LoWCs became near mid-air collisions (NMACs).  The 
small number of LoWCs that were the pilot’s responsibility when using the banding displays makes comparison of 
this metric among the display conditions challenging.  No conclusions are drawn regarding the severity of LoWCs 
between the displays using this metric. 
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Figure 11. Predicted and actual mitigated geometric severity of all encounters. 
The second method of evaluating LoWC severity is to examine the amount of time each aircraft spent in an LoWC 
or warning alert status. This temporal metric is useful because minor violations of well clear will also be of short 
duration, while longer durations represent extended durations in which the two aircraft are in a state of heightened 
risk. Although the functional relationship between duration and risk is not known, the two variables are positively 
correlated.  In addition, pilots are instructed to avoid LoWCs and warning alerts, and to maneuver immediately to 
regain well clear or remove the alert when these situations occur, so the pilots are to some degree attempting to 
minimize this metric. 
All encounters that resulted in some time spent in a warning alert were divided into their respective display 
conditions. They were then placed in 15 sec-wide bins and the total number of encounters in each bin plotted in the 
histogram in Figure 12.  The results largely parallel the LoWC rate results, with the information-only display having 
the largest total time in warning alert status and the most unique encounters in each bin, except for the 15–30 sec bin.  
The vector planner had the second-most time in warning alert status, and the banding displays had the least time in 
warning alert status.  It is important to avoid warning alerts because pilots will be permitted to deviate from their ATC 
clearance when these alerts occur, potentially impacting normal ATC operations and degrading safety. The banding 
displays are likely to cause less disruption to normal NAS operations and therefore should be strongly considered for 
use by DAA systems. 
 
Figure 12. Number of encounters that spent the given amount of time in a warning alert status. 
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 A histogram of the time spent in LoWC according to display condition is shown in Figure 13.  Again paralleling 
previous results on the rate of LoWC and time spent in warning alert status, the information-only display had the most 
cumulative time in LoWC, followed by the vector planner, and finally Stratway+ and the Omni Bands.  Although this 
result does not add insight into the relative strengths of the different displays, it does reinforce the conclusion than a 
display based on the Omni Bands is likely to provide the safest DAA system. 
 
Figure 13.  Number of encounters that spent the given amount of time in a LoWC status. 
The WCPI (see Section II.F) was also calculated for each trajectory that resulted in a LoWC and the results binned 
by metric magnitude and separated by display condition. The results of this process are shown in Figure 14.  The order 
of display conditions according to this metric are the same as the previous metrics, though the relative magnitudes of 
them tell a slightly different story: information-only and vector planner displays were quite close in terms of the total 
WCPI (34.4 and 30.9), primarily because the vector planner condition had more long duration LoWCs.  Stratway+ 
was intermediate (18.8) while the Omni Bands barely registered on this metric (3.7).  That latter display condition 
benefited from both short durations of LoWC and small penetrations of the separation cylinder. The WCPI metric, 
consistent with all other metrics presented in this paper, indicates that the Omni Bands performed the most successfully 
in helping the pilot avoid LoWCs and reducing the severity of LoWCs when they did occur. 
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Figure 14. Histogram of the WCPI values by display 
D. Pilot Response Time 
Gathering data to create a model of pilot response time is a key goal of these pilot-in-the-loop simulations.  Such 
models allow more realistic and accurate fast-time simulations that can be used to determine the frequency and 
outcomes of encounters simulated in this experiment. A detailed analysis of each step in a pilot’s response sequence 
is presented in Rorie, Fern, and Shively 2016, and a UAS pilot model is being developed at MIT Lincoln Laboratory 
using the identical alerting scheme and Omni Bands guidance designed for this experiment (Kuffner, Guendel, and 
Darrah 2016).  Those detailed models are necessary for simulations matching their level of fidelity, but for simpler 
simulations a straightforward distribution of response times may be more appropriate.   
The total response time between first alert and upload of a resolution maneuver was analyzed as a function of 
several independent variables: display type, time to first loss of separation, level of surveillance sensor uncertainty, 
and intruder type (cooperative vs. non-cooperative).  The latter independent variables showed little difference in 
response time between conditions, but the banding display response times were similar to each other and shorter than 
the other two displays.  Because of this similarity between the two banding displays and their overall good LoWC 
performance, the response-time data for those displays was combined into a single set.  That set was then analyzed 
for any effect of time to LoWC at first alert. It was found that when the first alert was within the warning threshold, 
the response times were significantly shorter than when the first alert was corrective.  This difference is consistent 
with the instructions provided to the pilots not to coordinate or seek ATC approval for well clear maneuvers when a 
warning alert is present.   
The response-time data for the two banding displays was divided into those encounters in which the first alert was 
less than 25 seconds to LoWC, and those in which the first alert was more than 25 seconds to LoWC.  Several 
distributions were fit to this data: the gamma distribution was the best fit for both sets.  Cumulative distributions of 
both the simulation data and the models are shown in Figure 15, along with the shape and scale parameters necessary 
to recreate those models.  Although the response-time models do not take some important factors into account when 
calculating a response time (e.g., follow-up maneuvers after the initial upload), these distributions should be useful 
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for lower-fidelity simulations that require an estimate of delay between the time when a threat is detected and the time 
a resolution maneuver is executed. 
 
Figure 15. DAA maneuver response time data and models. 
E. Surveillance Uncertainty 
The level of sensor uncertainty evaluated in this simulation did not cause significant differences in most of the 
metrics used to evaluate the displays.  The displays that performed best in terms of the number and severity of LoWCs 
with perfect information (the banding displays) also did the best in the surveillance uncertainty condition.  The major 
difference between the perfect and noisy conditions occurred when non-cooperative intruders were separated 
vertically by 500 ft: when uncertainty was present, the intruders would appear to change altitude from measurement 
step to measurement step, which would cause intermittent, spurious corrective and warning alerts between the correct 
preventive alerts.  In the perfect condition only preventive alerts were displayed. 
Pilots in the experiment occasionally maneuvered to avoid an intruder that was currently at the preventive alert 
stage; nearly every example of this type of maneuver was due to uncertainty in the vertical separation of the intruder 
from the ownship as described previously.  This fact is crucial to consider for the deployed DAA system because 
operationally the typical vertical separation between IFR and VFR aircraft (500 ft) is only slightly larger than the 
vertical separation standard (450 ft).  The closeness of these two standards means that UAS are likely to request lateral 
maneuvers from ATC to separate themselves from non-cooperative intruders even if those intruders have more than 
the minimum required separation.  This additional maneuvering compared with cooperative aircraft is not likely to 
impact the efficiency of the NAS because encounters between UAS and non-cooperative aircraft are rare (less than 
one encounter for every 5 flight hours, [RTCA 2015]) and because under current operations manned aircraft pilots do 
not know the precise altitude of non-cooperative intruders and so are more likely to request vectors from ATC to avoid 
them. 
IV. Conclusions 
This study evaluated four DAA display configurations, each with different informational and guidance elements.  
Two different DAA algorithms drove the display elements for these systems.  Sixteen UAS pilots flew each 
combination of the display configurations, with half being given “perfect” DAA surveillance sensor errors and the 
other half experiencing errors that were comparable, and in some cases slightly better than, errors that were measured 
in DAA system flight tests.   
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The displays that showed intruder alert information for altitudes and headings near the current UAS flight state 
had significantly fewer losses of well clear, from a statistical as well as from a practical perspective.  Compared with 
the information-only display, which provided alerting but no guidance information at all, the rate of losses of well 
clear was less by a factor of four.  In addition to fewer losses, those losses that did occur lasted for shorter periods and 
did not penetrate as far into the geometric “separation cylinder” as those in the non-banded displays.  In particular, the 
Omni Bands display, which indicated the level of alert in its banding symbology, had slightly better performance than 
a similar display, which showed only the presence of an alert and not its severity.  It is recommended that DAA traffic 
displays implement a band-type display based on the characteristics reported in this and companion papers (Rorie, 
Fern, and Shively 2016) in order to improve the safety of UAS operations in the National Airspace System. 
A modest level of DAA surveillance sensor uncertainty did not affect the rate of losses of well clear or their 
severity, but it did cause pilots to make maneuvers when their UAS was separated vertically from an intruder by 500 
ft, which is acceptable under today’s airspace procedures.  Finally, pilot response time distributions were calculated 
for cases when the first alert from an intruder was a (less imminent) corrective alert versus a (more imminent) warning 
alert.  These response-time distributions may be used to improve the fidelity of non-human-in-the-loop simulations. 
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